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Luke Ashworth has weighed in as a young legal scholar on a 
subject of exceeding complexity and importance.1 His work does 
what a good Note should do in being well-organized, clearly 
written, providing useful background, engaging existent 
literature, and advancing (and supporting) a thesis grounded in 
policy considerations. And Luke’s point of view is as 
unmistakable as it is provocative: the much-ballyhooed regulation 
of hedge fund advisers adopted in the landmark 2010 Dodd–
Frank legislation2 is wasteful, unnecessary, and should be 
modified. 
Let me welcome Luke to the scholarly world, and extend to 
him the customary return for thoughtful work: a response. My 
remarks are designed less to offer critical comments than to place 
his subject and his views into a larger context, and to offer my 
perspective on why in 2010 we got the fund adviser law we did, 
and how that law illuminates larger and longstanding concerns 
about the sometimes incongruent investor protection, capital 
formation, and public interest goals of U.S. financial regulation. 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ Robert O. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University 
School of Law, LeJeune Distinguished Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas 
(Minneapolis) School of Law. The author thanks Professor Wulf Kaal for his 
helpful comments. 
 1. Luther R. Ashworth II, Is Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Necessary 
to Accomplish the Goals of the Dodd–Frank Act’s Title IV?, 70 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 651 (2013). 
 2. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
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II. Investor Protection 
Luke faults the investor protection rationale underlying the 
hedge fund adviser registration and disclosure requirements of 
Dodd–Frank. He points out that there was already a Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) anti-fraud rule, adopted in 
2007,3 and that hedge funds supposedly draw sophisticated 
investors who can fend for themselves.4 I think the investor 
protection case for the registration requirement is a bit stronger 
than Luke believes, although that in turn serves to highlight in 
the fund area a question that long has loomed over federal 
securities regulation more generally: does mandated information 
disclosure always protect investors, is that its real goal,5 and is 
advancing that objective always consistent with other worthy 
policies? But before briefly making a few points about investor 
protection, let me address the seeming incongruity of the 
traditional investor protection aim of federal securities law 
generally with the specific concerns of Dodd–Frank and the acute 
financial crisis that preceded it. 
The reason for joining longstanding SEC concerns about 
investor protection with the sprawling systemic-financial-risk 
regulation of Dodd–Frank is hidden in plain view early in Luke’s 
paper. Prior to Dodd–Frank, the SEC had failed for some time in 
its efforts to regulate investment pools and their advisers, as it 
consistently espoused investor protection in its quest to do so.6 
                                                                                                     
 3. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (2011). 
 4. See Ashworth, supra note 1, at 654 (“In sum, hedge fund adviser 
registration is unnecessary because (i) there is already an adequate anti-fraud 
rule in place; (ii) hedge funds have increased transparency to their investors; 
and (iii) hedge funds have a sophisticated investor class that does not need the 
same protections provided to ordinary investors.”). 
 5. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for 
a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 721–23 (1984) (providing a 
theory in support of a mandatory disclosure system in the securities law realm); 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 671–73 (1984) (analyzing “the 
functions of legal rules and rules compelling disclosure promulgated by the 
national government”). 
 6. A 2003 SEC Report on hedge funds noted that although the agency had 
studied systemic risks associated with hedge funds, the report focused on 
investor protection concerns raised by hedge funds. See generally SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS (2003) [hereinafter 2003 
SEC REPORT], http://www.sec.gov/news/ studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf. 
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The horrific 2008 crisis, viewed on this issue alone, was an 
unexpected and serendipitous regulatory opening, a crisis not to 
be wasted by a frustrated administrative agency. After all, more 
stringent securities market regulation typically is not adopted in 
booming and flush times; it follows on the heels of financial 
distress and can be overbroad and too far sweeping.7 In the 
aftermath of the historic financial meltdown of 2008–09, with 
victims and villains aplenty, and regulatory nuance in short 
supply—in contrast to the abundant regulatory shame—who 
could be opposed to better investor protection, whether or not 
faulty protection of hedge fund investors had really contributed to 
the crisis or, by being improved, would prevent another? For the 
SEC, the regulatory iron in Congress was hot and so the agency 
opportunistically struck, but for a cause it had sought long before 
our recent calamity.8 Luke rightly seeks in vain for the 
connection between the 2008 crisis and the need for fund adviser 
registration on investor protection grounds because there likely is 
none. If protection for investors was needed, it was in spite of, not 
because of, the crisis. But calculated timing and implausible 
policy connection to crisis aside, maybe there still is something to 
be said for better protecting fund investors. 
Hedge funds and their advisers almost invariably are 
organized as limited partnerships or limited liability companies.9 
Whether organized in a state in the United States or under the 
law of the Cayman Islands, hedge fund vehicles are not 
stringently regulated under any of these laws. Under U.S. law, 
moreover, notably Delaware, states have adopted a highly 
                                                                                                     
 7. For example, Professor Roberta Romano has argued that provisions of 
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act were not a focus of “careful deliberation by Congress” 
and were “enacted under conditions of limited legislative debate, during a media 
frenzy involving several high-profile fraud and insolvency cases” combined with 
“what appeared to be a free-falling stock market, and a looming election 
campaign in which corporate scandals would be an issue.” Roberta Romano, The 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE 
L.J. 1521, 1527 (2005). 
 8. See 2003 SEC REPORT, supra note 6, at 88–89 (recommending 
regulation of hedge funds by amending the Advisers Act of 1940 as a result of 
the SEC’s Hedge Fund Roundtable). 
 9. See Franklin Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term 
Capital Management, 13 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 189, 190 (1999) (“[A] hedge fund 
can be organized as a limited liability company, [and] most are organized as 
limited liability partnerships . . . .”). 
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flexible, contractarian approach,10 allowing the fund sponsor to 
craft a deal document that contractually specifies investor rights. 
If it is not set forth in the partnership or operating agreement, 
investors do not have it, including ongoing access to full 
information.11 Moreover, the sponsors themselves can reduce or 
even eliminate their fiduciary duties, thereby removing even 
traditional state law safeguards for egregious adviser conduct.12 
It is possible that, as a result of Dodd–Frank, information in 
Form ADV,13 filed with the SEC, coupled with on-site agency 
examinations, will afford greater transparency to regulators and 
investors, deter adviser wrongdoing, and facilitate earlier 
discovery of past misconduct.14 This may extend, for example, to 
determining: the amount and type of a fund’s leverage, that a 
fund’s portfolio assets are of the kind and amount (appropriately 
valued) as reported and are safe, whether funds performed as 
stated, whether insider trading or other wrongful activity is 
engaged in, whether conflicts of interest exist and are handled 
appropriately, and so on. Investors may be able to, and perhaps 
they should, take better measures to fend for themselves and 
                                                                                                     
 10. See, e.g., Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 290 (Del. 
1999) (noting that “the policy of freedom of contract underlies” both Delaware 
limited liability companies as well as limited partnerships). 
 11. For example, section 18-1101 of the Delaware Limited Liability 
Company Act reiterates that Delaware gives “maximum effect to the principle of 
freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company 
agreements.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2012). 
 12. See generally Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 701 (2011). 
 13. See Form ADV, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www. 
sec.gov/answers/form adv.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2013) (“Form ADV is the 
uniform form used by investment advisers to register with both the SEC and 
state securities authorities.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 14. This is a professed SEC objective for the regulation. See Rules 
Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Release No. 
IA 3221, at 125–30 (June 22, 2011) [hereinafter SEC Implementing Release], 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3221.pdf. On October 9, 2012, the SEC, 
Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, sent a letter to newly 
registered investment advisers explaining that certain high-risk areas will be 
focused on during agency examinations. See Letter from Drew Bowden, Deputy 
Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
(Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/letter-presence-exams.pdf. 
These areas are marketing, portfolio management, conflicts of interest, safety of 
client assets, and valuation. Id. 
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elicit stronger protections (including monitoring mechanisms), 
but a tough financial cop on the beat can also be on the lookout to 
head off trouble and to publicly punish (and deter) troublemakers 
and thereby can also help to upgrade industry norms. 
The preexisting anti-fraud rule noted by Luke likely curbs 
some wrongdoing, but it does not mandate the fuller disclosure of 
information required by Form ADV, either to investors or the 
SEC. And its proscription of misconduct is limited to its quite 
general phrasing.15 By analogy, the venerable Rule 10b-516 is not 
thought, in its role as an “anti-fraud” rule, to make other 
mandated disclosures unnecessary under the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934.17 That rule supplements but does not 
supplant more detailed disclosure obligations.18 Of course, any 
disclosure regime—particularly one aimed at an industry that 
historically has been opaque and loathes to divulge much 
information—runs the risk that information will be “sanitized” to 
screen out (or artfully describe) negative information or, due to 
lags in reporting, simply be unhelpfully “stale.” Hedge fund 
advisers are likely to be cautious in their initial disclosures and 
are sure to pay great attention to evolving practices of other 
registrants. 
And it may be open to serious doubt whether so-called 
“sophisticated” or “accredited” investors truly are financially 
sophisticated and able to self-help as they are assumed to be. No 
doubt fund investors are not as financially illiterate as retail 
investors, as was so alarmingly noted in a 182-page study 
released by the SEC on August 30, 2012.19 But given the wealth 
and income definitions for accredited investors—largely 
unaltered over the last thirty years, anyway20—the behavioral 
                                                                                                     
 15. For the exact language of the preexisting anti-fraud rule for hedge 
funds, see 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (2011). 
 16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2010). 
 18. See, e.g., id. § 78m (stating various disclosure obligations that certain 
issuers of securities, such as publicly-traded companies, must file with the SEC). 
 19. See generally SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY REGARDING FINANCIAL 
LITERACY AMONG INVESTORS (Aug. 20,2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ 
2012/917-financial-literacy-study-part1.pdf. 
 20. The original definition of “accredited investor” found in Regulation D 
was adopted in 1982. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. It was altered modestly by § 413(a) of 
Dodd–Frank to exclude the value of an investor’s primary residence in 
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and regulatory premise is that relatively well-off investors must 
be considerably more financially astute than the ordinary 
investor.21 Yet, although some funds, and certain sectors in 
particular, can and do provide mouth-watering gains when 
measured over selected periods, on average hedge funds, as an 
aggregate investment class, have underperformed risk-free 
Treasury bills due to an upsurge in the sheer number of funds 
since 2000.22 And many fund investors seem to follow the typical 
retail investor strategy of chasing “yesterday’s returns” and 
preferring large, well-known funds.23 More information alone, of 
course, may do nothing to stop this dynamic, but consistently low 
returns over a long enough period may lead to a market solution, 
with investors eventually migrating to other asset classes. But it 
does suggest that if numerous accredited investors are not 
particularly savvy on this front, they may be more susceptible to 
wrongdoing than is commonly supposed. And they certainly make 
attractive candidates for a good fleecing.24 
Even if investor protection is a worthy goal, however, and one 
the SEC shrewdly advanced on the coattails of the financial 
crisis, Congress has a disturbingly familiar habit of flip-flopping 
on the subject. Just two years after investor protection was 
injected into the larger systemic risk concerns of Dodd–Frank, 
Congress enacted the Jumpstart Our Business Startup Act 
                                                                                                     
calculating net worth. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 413(a), 124 
Stat. 1376, 1577–79 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b). 
 21. Just as in 1973, Professor Harold Marsh noted the “myth of the ‘expert’ 
expert,” Harold Marsh, New Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Securities 
Offerings—A Panel Discussion, 28 BUS. LAW. 505, 527 (1973), so too may we have 
a “myth of the ‘sophisticated’ sophisticated” investor. 
 22. See Fiammetta Rocco, The Success of Hedge Funds: Masterclass, 
ECONOMIST, July 7, 2012, at 77–78 (noting that although some hedge fund 
investors do very well, “on average hedge funds have underperformed even risk-
free Treasury bills . . . . [b]ecause the bulk of investors’ capital has flooded in 
over the past ten years”) (reviewing SIMON LACK, THE HEDGE FUND MIRAGE: THE 
ILLUSION OF BIG MONEY AND WHY IT’S TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE (2012)). 
 23. Id. 
 24. The North American Securities Administrators Association reported in 
August 2012 that, for the second year in a row, Regulation D Rule 506 private 
offerings were, along with real estate investment schemes, the most reported 
products at the center of state securities enforcement actions. See Richard Hill, 
JOBS Act Opens New Path for Scammers, NASAA Says in Annual List of Top 
Schemes, 44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1618, 1618 (2012). 
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(JOBS Act)25 in an effort to bolster another policy goal, capital 
formation among smaller issuers26—who likely will target less 
savvy investors than those in hedge funds. In effect, this was a 
legislative effort to “jumpstart” economic activity. Although 
investor protection and capital formation are both key policy 
goals of federal securities laws,27 they can be in conflict. Efforts to 
“ease” the burden on capital formation frequently translate into 
less disclosure, reduced regulatory scrutiny, heightened fraud, 
diminished investor protection, and resulting public cynicism.28 
The recent SEC proposal under the JOBS Act to permit general 
solicitation in connection with exempt offerings if, among other 
requirements, the securities are only sold to accredited 
investors29—even if, apparently, they are “publicly” offered—will 
apply to hedge funds relying on exemptions under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940.30 Although the advertising rules of the 
Advisers Act of 194031 remain applicable to fund advisers,32 they 
                                                                                                     
 25. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (aiming to increase job creation and 
economic growth by improving access to the public capital markets for emerging 
growth companies). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2010) (detailing 
the first major federal legislation to regulate the offer and sale of securities by 
requiring certain disclosures to investors). 
 28. Cf. Luis Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Capital Formation 
from the Investor’s Perspective (Dec. 3, 2012), available at http://www.sec. 
gov/news/speech/2012/spch120312laa.htm (explaining that investor fraud is the 
“black hole[] of capital formation,” so investor protection is necessary for true 
capital formation through “rules to promote full and fair disclosure, reliable 
financial information, and accountability for market participants”). 
 29. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and 
General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act 
Release No. 33-9354, 77 Fed. Reg. 54,464, 54,464 (proposed Aug. 29, 2012) (“The 
proposed amendment to Rule 506 would provide that the prohibition against 
general solicitation and general advertising contained in Rule 502(c) of 
Regulation D would not apply to offers and sales of securities made pursuant to 
Rule 506, provided that all purchasers of the securities are accredited 
investors.”). As of February 6, 2013, no amendment to Rule 506 had been made 
in this regard. 
 30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64. 
 31. Id. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21. 
 32. See Richard A. Goldman et al., Amending Rule 506—Opportunities For 
Private Funds, LAW360 (Sep. 07, 2012, 2:11 PM), http://www.law360.com/ 
securities/articles/376400?nl_pk=f77a7383_d68a-4922-bf24-bed5 (last visited 
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protect existing clients not prospective ones. It is hard to believe, 
moreover, that widespread advertising will not lead to greater 
interest in hedge funds among those who, although “accredited,” 
do not, in their pursuit of juiced returns and the status of being 
“in” a hedge fund, fully understand what they are doing and the 
true nature of the risks they are taking, including the way in 
which their exposure to leverage risk is elevated through the 
funds’ use of debt and the great difficulty of exiting the 
investment. Also, particularly challenging for investors is 
understanding exactly how a fund is valuing its assets, an area in 
which practices vary widely. 
Whether sponsor investor-verification techniques and 
enhanced industry “best practices” will successfully filter 
unqualified investors lured by enticing advertising remains to be 
seen. This is of great concern to state securities regulators. 
Sponsors themselves are concerned about this issue. The Hedge 
Fund Association has sought greater clarification from the SEC 
as to how funds should verify investor accreditation, inasmuch as 
the SEC’s proposed rule failed to offer a safe harbor.33 Such a rule 
also would position funds to defend against charges of 
wrongdoing in bringing in nonaccredited investors, by permitting 
them to argue that they followed SEC guidance. Such guidance, 
moreover, if given, might become a de facto industry standard, 
thereby impeding development of more rigorous practices. 
The hedge fund anti-fraud rule of 2007, even coupled with 
the 2010 adviser registration requirement criticized by Luke, may 
do little to curb likely damage to investors in an overly zealous 
policy pursuit of “capital formation.” In this way, Luke’s pointed 
investor protection concern on the fund-adviser front joins a 
larger and longer debate over whether and how the federal 
                                                                                                     
Jan. 19, 2013) (“[A]dvisers that are registered with the SEC must continue to 
comply with rules relating to advertising under the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940 . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 33. See Brian Mahoney, Hedge Fund Group Wants Safe Harbor Under 
Advertising Rule, LAW360 (Sept. 13, 2012, 2:56 PM), http://www. 
law360.com/articles/378011/print?/section=securities (last visited Jan. 19, 2013) 
(“A nationwide hedge fund lobbying group on Thursday asked U.S. regulators to 
create a safe harbor provision clearly stating how funds should verify the 
credentials of investor-clients to whom they can now advertise, saying new 
proposed rules left their obligations unclear.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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securities laws’ philosophy of full disclosure can achieve that goal 
while also balancing it with other policy goals with which it 
sometimes clashes. 
III. Systemic Risk 
If Luke is tough on investor protection, he is more generous 
on systemic risk. However, although he credits the systemic risk 
concerns of Dodd–Frank as worthwhile, Luke thinks adviser 
registration is not necessary to advance this goal. Instead, he 
argues, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) can 
collect pertinent data directly from fund advisers through Form 
PF,34 without the intervention of the SEC. Even this more direct 
approach, however, invites certain concerns.  
Given the ninety-day or longer lags in receiving data, 
information provided to the SEC and FSOC can be far more 
unhelpfully stale than fresher “real time” data. A lot of 
undetected systemic risk can develop in the meantime. This is 
somewhat meliorated by an obligation to “promptly” update 
specified information that becomes “materially inaccurate.”35 The 
key premise, of course, is that if adverse developments occur, 
managers will report them immediately, rather than later. A key 
risk, however, is that managers may tend not to regard adverse 
developments as material, perhaps out of simple hope and belief 
that conditions will change or from a simple desire not to alert 
the SEC. Moreover, one wonders whether staff at the SEC and 
the FSOC can efficiently handle a large influx of data and, upon 
distilling it, accurately identify disturbing aggregate trends. It is 
easier in hindsight to see potentially destabilizing patterns than 
it is while awash in data and searching for, but not wishing to 
overreact to, possible indicators of trouble. Only time will tell on 
this front. 
But concerns about hedge funds’ role in systemic risk may 
mask a deeper clash of interests, i.e., that between the interests 
                                                                                                     
 34. See Form PF Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/pfrd/pfrdfaq.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 
2013) (providing a basic overview of Form PF) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 35. SEC Implementing Release, supra note 14, at 114. 
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of fund investors and the larger public interest as reflected in 
systemic (social) risk concerns. Hedge funds command large pools 
of capital, deploy significant leverage, engage in rapid trading 
activity, and may profit from and magnify volatility.36 Whether 
this creates or exacerbates unacceptable systemic (social) risk is 
unclear but should be ascertained. What is clear is that funds 
need investors. Thus, if funds are the sort of financial vehicle that 
contributes to systemic instability, it is because the very financial 
wherewithal to do so is supplied by investors. The public policy 
problem, ironically, may not be to protect investors from fund 
advisers but, in effect, may be to protect the financial system 
from risks caused by inappropriate use of the very concentrated 
capital supplied by investors. Viewed this way, hedge funds may 
present less of an “adviser vs. investor” regulatory issue than a 
“fund vs. society” concern.37 
Here, it might be better to acknowledge outright that 
mandated disclosure for systemic risk concerns is just that and 
not cloak it in investor protection rhetoric. As has been noted 
about the federal Bureau of Corporations, established in 1903, its 
purpose similarly was aimed at “collecting industrial data and 
investigating corporate trade practices as a deterrent against 
illicit corporate activities.”38 The information was aimed at 
consumption outside the firm, not at those investing in it.39 And 
disclosure was required to deter activity that might enrich 
investors, not damage them.40 As with hedge fund regulation, 
then, that early 20th century disclosure law was designed to 
                                                                                                     
 36. See Edwards, supra note 9, at 189–91 (describing general 
characteristics of hedge funds). 
 37. For a similar argument about early 20th century Progressive demands 
for greater financial information under federal law, see Thomas W. Joo, 
Comment: Corporate Governance & The “D-Word,” 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1579, 
1582–83 (2006). 
 38. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. 
L. REV. 1189, 1219 (1986). 
 39. See Joo, supra note 37, at 1582 (“Progressives wanted disclosure 
because they believed it would create accountability, not to shareholders, but to 
‘the public.’”). 
 40. See id. at 1583 (“[T]he Bureau required a corporation’s ‘disclosure’ not 
to empower or protect that corporation’s shareholders, but to discourage the 
corporation from anticompetitive activity—activity that could have enriched its 
shareholders.”). 
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protect the public interest, not investors. This suggests a 
potentially deeper clash of policy goals in adviser regulation. 
What is good about hedge funds—for at least some, perhaps 
many, investors—may not be good for larger social interests. 
Fortunately, we can sidestep this issue for now because what 
Dodd–Frank really does on the adviser regulation front is simply 
mandate data collection. The requirements, although law, are 
really in the nature of an extended study. The aim, paradoxically, 
is to learn more about the historically opaque hedge funds and 
their activities precisely to ascertain whether and how to regulate 
them. It may well be concluded that no further regulatory action 
is needed or even that a rollback is in order. Or, perhaps 
particular areas of concern will be targeted for action. But first 
we need to know how fund advisers themselves are responding, 
an area in which Professor Wulf Kaal is gathering and assessing 
useful data.41 Kaal’s early findings in a survey of about ninety 
hedge fund managers is that the industry appears to be only 
“modestly affected” by the new requirements.42 Approximately 
seventy-two percent of managers reported no expected strategic 
response to Dodd–Frank, with smaller funds more likely to be 
affected.43 Although earnings and profits were expected to decline 
due to higher compliance costs—with almost half of responding 
advisers outsourcing compliance work44—seventy-five percent of 
managers did not expect investor returns to suffer.45 Over forty 
percent have changed their marketing materials,46 a figure that 
may rise yet again if existing restrictions on advertising are 
dropped, as recently proposed.47 
                                                                                                     
 41. See generally Wulf A. Kaal, The Effects of Hedge Fund Manager 
Registration Under the Dodd–Frank Act—An Empirical Study, 50 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2150377. 
 42. Id. (manuscript at 59). 
 43. Id. (manuscript at 56); see also Wulf A. Kaal, The Effect of the Dodd–
Frank Act on the Hedge Fund Industry 41 (Feb. 2, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript) (asserting that certain data suggest that the compliance and 
administrative costs created by the Dodd–Frank Act may disproportionally 
affect smaller hedge funds) (on file with author). 
 44. Kaal, supra note 41 (manuscript at 42). 
 45. Id. (manuscript at 53). 
 46. Id. (manuscript at 42). 
 47. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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And from there, we can see what the SEC and FSOC—or 
Congress—does with the new trove of data, either on the investor 
protection or systemic risk fronts. Luke’s skepticism on the 
former may be borne out, thereby further spotlighting the latter. 
And this would then open an even more potentially disquieting 
debate about the social responsibilities and legal rights of those 
who facilitate rapid, large capital movements in a way that may 
destabilize modern markets. Dodd–Frank certainly takes no 
position on, but may set up, that far more difficult conversation. 
